INTRODUCTION

I
In-Tank Precipitation
and Extended Sludge Processing (ESP) prepare radioactive wastes, currently stored in the Savannah River Site (SRS) high level waste tank h, for feed to processes that w i l l result in the permanent disposal of the wastes. ESP processes high level waste sludge to remove aluminum and soluble salts, so that the sludge is suitable for feed to the Defense Waste Processing Facility @WF) vitrification facilities. lTP processes salt solutim to remove most of the radioactive contamination for feed to the DWPF vitrification facilities, leaving a decontaminated salt solution suitable for disposal in the low-level waste salt-stone facility.
With the exception of salt dissolution to provide feed to lTP, the Vatious portions of the criticality safety basis for the ITP and ESP operations are documented in numerous reports. Reference [ 11 summarizes the information for the ITP and ESP processes, but not for salt dissolution. This memorandum provides a summary of the current safety basis, including that for salt dissolution, in a single document.
SUMMARY
This report describes the criticality safety basis of the ITP and ESP processes, and of the salt dissolution process in W a s t e Tank 4 1H. The lTP process indudes precipitation of most of the radioactive materia, precipitate filtration, precipitate washing, pmipitate storage, and monitoring; andstoringdecontaminated filtrate for feed to saltstone. Thc ITP facilities include the waste processing tank, the precipitate hold tank, the filter building and benzent stripper columns, waste transfer lines, and a t r a t e hold tanks.
The ESP process includes water washing of the sludge to remove salt, and aluminum dissolution, using sodium hydroxide solutions, to remove aluminum. The ESP facilities currently include three processing tanks, two of which may @so be used as DWPF washed sludge feed tanks, steam spargers for the aluminum diisolution tank, and associated waste transfer lines. One of these tanks, Tank42H, mayafso be usedas an lTP blend tank whar it is not used in ESP.
salt dissolution involves the addition of water to the high level waste sat tanks, and may k l u d e agitation of the solutim to enhance tbe sat dissolution ratc.
Neutron absorbing materials inherently pnsent in lTP and ESP make them safely subcritical under all normal and credibie a b d operatiasconditioas. Material sampliq inboth ITP and ESP is . In all of these processes, the relative solubilities of the fissionable materias and neutron absorbers are low. The alkaline chemistq maintained in the waste tanks is an essential condition to maintai~ the low Solubilities. Because the waste must be kept allcaline for corrosion control purposes, it is not credible that acidic conditions w i l l be allowed to develop to the point of affecting criticality safety in the carbon steel waste tanks. For the one place where acidic conditions might be expected, in the ITP filtration system, the safety of the acidic coaditioz~~ has been evaluated 14).
U S e d t o p n w i d e a d d i t i o n a~
DISCUSSION
ESP Process DescriDtion
The ESP process treats high level waste sludge to prepare it for feed to the DWPF vitrification facility by removing soluble salt and excess aluminum. Sludge in the HLW tanlc farms contains more sodium than is acceptable in DWPF. Additionally, the sludge h n the H-Area Canyon HM process wasttr cantains large quantities of aluminum. The aluminum would require increased glass volumcs in DWPF to allow dequate mtmi of the glass viscosity during processing.
Sodium salts are removed by washing the sludge in water, with the resulting salt solutim transferred to a waste evaporator feed tank. Aluminum is dissolved using steam sparging and sodium hydroxide solutions. Additional detail is available in reference [ 11.
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DISCUSSION (continued) ESP Criticalitv Safem Basis
The high level waste sludges contain sufficient neutron poisons to preclude criticality during any non-acidic process conditions. The high level wastes are kept alkaline due to corrosion contrJ requirements. The high level waste storage tanks are constructed of carbon steel. A chemistry control program is required to prevent corrosion from causing tank leaks. Thus the waste is kept alkaline, independent of any criticality safety considerations. This alkaline chemistry sipficantty limits the actinide solubilities.
Several documents were developed to show the necessary ratio of neutron absorbers to fissile materials to assure safely subcritical conditions in infinite volume media [7,8, and 91. A review of waste receipts over the lifetime of the HLW tank farms from 1955 to 1992 shows that the average receipts contained sufficient neutron poisons to preclude the possibility of criticality [lo] . The review shows that in some months, the ratios are not sufficient by themselves to preclude criticality. But the blend of the individual transfers from the storage tanks is safely subcritical in each of the HLW tanks that can feed sludge to ESP [5] .
The F-Area wastes and tbe early H-Area wastes were generated by the PUREX process. The process included the use of iron and manganese compounds in sufficient quantities that the average waste would be safely subcritical. The iron and manganese oxides provide sufficient neutron absorption to keep the waste subcritical. In addition, the uranium in the PUREX process was depleted in D5U, so tbat the "*U by itself would provide sufficient neutron absorption to preclude criticality.
Beghung in 1959, H-Area Sepamtions facilities started the HM process. The high-heat, highlevel waste generated by this process generally contained sufficient iron and sufficient manganese to preclude Criticality. During 85 of 404 months, the HM process high-hat waste did not contain sufficient neutron absorbers. These materials blended with other waste in the receipt tanks so thait the mixture is safely subcritical. The lowhat high-level waste streams for the HM process did not always contain sufficient iron and manganese to ensure a safely subcritical sludge. But the bulk studge in each of these low heat waste receipt tanks did contain sufficient neutron poisons. The sludge transfer process includes slurrying of the sludge prior to transferring it to the ESP tanks. Thus the blended sludgethat will be receive4 in the ESP tankswill remain subcritical.
As stated above, the r c v i c w d w a s t e s generatedin 1992 dearlier. W a s t e s generatedafter 1992areexp&cdtoamtunlc ' to contain sufficient neutron poisoas that then is no risk of criticaliv. However, the a&quacy of neutron poisons in the waste sludges received since 1992 must be verified before tksc sludges are fed to the ESP proctss.
During aluminum dissolution, some uranium will also be dissolved, but a large majority of the iron, manganese, and plutonium w i l l remain h the sludge [ 1 11, Dissolution of the uranium will not risk criticality in the aluminum dissolution tank. The continued presence of iron and manganese w i l l keep the sludge safely subcritical. The uranium concentration in the supernate w i l l remain small. Reference [ 12) indicates that the solubility is less than 20 milligrams per liter under normal highlevel waste conditions. Samples have shown concentrations as high as 56 milligrams per liter (1 31.
These concentrations are too low to support criticality in aqueous solutions. The disparity between different maximum uranium solubility information reinforces the need for hrther study. Also, the draft S A R Hazard Analysis and Chapter 3 exclude duminum dissolution [ 151. Thus operation of the aluminum dissolution process will require revision to the Authorization Basis. 
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TTp Process DescriDtion
Ti-Butyl Phosphate Effects
Addition of txi-n-bulyl phosphate (TBP) to the lTF' process was e v a l d in reference [3]. This reference shows that the chemistry of uranium and plutonium in alkaline waste solutions is si%ruficantly Merent from the ciaermstry that is exmutered in the acidic solutions used in solvent ex&action for actinide materials. In alkaline conditions, the Uranium and plutonium solubilities are si@cantly lower, and the complexing of actinides with TBP is ueghgible. These differences preclude the introductioa of any risk of criticality being caused soiely by use of T B P in the ITP 
Suspended Solids from Salt Dissolution
During the salt dissolution process, some insoluble solids may be suspended in the solution. Fissile materials in these solids could be transferred to the precipitation tank. As discussed below for Tank 41H salt dissolution, the solids will have sufficient neutron absorbers that they can not cause or contribute to a criticality. This is lzecessary to ensure that salt dissoiution does not create a nuclear criticaliv risk. It is necessacy that the presence of sufEcieat neutron absorbers be documented before salt dissolution begins in a given salt tank. In tank 4 lH, agitation for salt dissolution will be provided (if required) by inserting long-shaft slurry pumps, so that the pump m d~r is above the tank bp, but the pump volute can be l o w e d to within a few inches of the salt surface. The pump is rotated so that the discharge streams provide a strong jet of solution with sufficient agitation to disrupt the layer of concentrated salt solution, and suspend insoluble solids that may,&erwise accumulate on the salt surfice. [9,24, and 251, zinc [24 and 251, and 
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